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How the Nebraska Supreme Court Became an 
Immigration Gatekeeper 
Meghan Johnson & Yasmin Yavar* 
 
I. Introduction 
Children unlawfully present in the United States who have 
been abused, neglected, or abandoned by a parent are among the 
most vulnerable members of society. In the Immigration Act of 1990, 
which was in line with humanitarian and practical concerns, 
Congress introduced a path for such children to attain lawful 
immigration statuses, which would allow them to be classified as 
“special immigrant juveniles” and subsequently obtain Special 
Immigrant Juvenile Status (“SIJS”). Years later, eligibility for SIJS 
continues to be an open and evolving concept. This Article explores 
recent changes to SIJS eligibility, highlighting a state court decision 
that limits this important form of relief beyond what was provided for 
in the statute and in a way that threatens to deny relief to children in 
need.  
Eligibility for SIJS has changed and expanded over the 
years.1 The original statute provided relief to children declared 
dependent on a U.S. juvenile court who had been deemed eligible for 
long-term foster care and for whom the court had determined it was 
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1 For a brief background on the purpose and evolution of SIJS relief, see generally 
Section II of the Department of Homeland Security’s proposed regulations 
implementing 2008 amendments to the SIJS statute, Special Immigrant Juvenile 
Petitions, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,978 (proposed Sept. 6, 2011) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. 
pts. 204, 205, 245).  
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not in their best interest to return to their respective home countries.2 
The language was amended in 1997 to clarify that SIJS relief was 
only intended to benefit those children who could demonstrate that 
they had suffered abuse, neglect, and abandonment.3 In late 2008, 
eligibility for SIJS expanded in various ways, including the 
replacement of the requirement of eligibility for long-term foster care 
with a requirement that a juvenile’s reunification with one or both 
parents is not viable due to abuse, abandonment, neglect, or a similar 
basis under state law.4 With the 2008 revisions, the number of 
individuals submitting petitions to the immigration authorities for 
SIJS relief nearly doubled.5    
Applying for SIJS involves a complicated and time-
consuming three-step process and requires legal resources that many 
children in need are unable to access. The first step in the application 
process is to request that a state court,6 acting in its family or juvenile 
capacity, enter certain findings regarding the child’s family 
situation.7 Use of local courts in this manner allows federal 
immigration authorities to rely on the special expertise of juvenile 
and family courts in making determinations about proper parental 
                                                     
2 Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 153(a), 104 Stat. 4978 (1990).   
3 Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 113, 111 Stat. 2440 (1997). 
4 William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 235(d)(1), 122 Stat. 5044 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1232). 
5 In fiscal year 2009, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) 
received 1,484 SIJS petitions; in 2008, USCIS received 1,361 petitions; in 2007, 
USCIS received 739 petitions. Special Immigrant Juvenile Petitions, 76 Fed. Reg. 
at 54,984.   
6 Steps 2 and 3 involve applications filed with the immigration authorities, 
including USCIS and are detailed below.   
7 The required findings are that (1) the immigrant has been declared dependent on a 
juvenile court located in the U.S. or, by such a court, have been legally committed 
to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a State, or an 
individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court; (2) the immigrant’s 
reunification with one or both parent’s not be viable due to abuse, neglect, 
abandonment, or a similar basis under State law; and (3) it would not be in the 
immigrant’s best interest to be returned to his or his parents’ previous country of 
nationality or country of last habitual residence. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(J) 
(West 2012).  
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care and a child’s best interest. The reliance on local courts, however, 
also allows for the introduction of differing interpretations and 
applications of federal law among and between the states.8    
This Article examines one state court’s interpretation of the 
law, demonstrating how it limits access to federal immigration relief 
in a way that is out of line both with other states and with the 
apparent intent of Congress in providing for SIJS relief. Part II of this 
Article offers a sample case of a child who appears to be an intended 
candidate for SIJS. Part III provides a background on SIJS, briefly 
exploring its origin and practical effects and outlining the process of 
applying for this form of relief. Part III also explains a state court’s 
involvement in making the factual findings necessary for applying 
for SIJS and discusses the potential for disparate interpretations of 
federal immigration laws across the nation. Part IV analyzes a recent 
Nebraska Supreme Court opinion that interprets the SIJS statute to 
foreclose SIJS relief for certain children and also reviews the impact 
of this precedent on the availability of SIJS relief in Part II’s sample 
case and more generally. This Article ultimately concludes that the 
Nebraska precedent institutes an unnecessary and improper limitation 
on this important form of relief. 
 
II. Sample Case 
 
The stories of undocumented children who enter the United 
States alone are many and varied. Such children may journey here 
because they long to be with a parent whom they barely know, to 
escape gang violence in their home countries, to pursue the 
opportunities they believe are available in the United States, and so 
forth.9 Some of the children satisfy the qualifications for SIJS, and 
                                                     
8 The differing interpretations and applications of the law arise when a state court 
in State A, for example, issues an opinion binding in that state that applies federal 
law in one way. Courts in another state, State B, unbound by the precedent in State 
A, may adopt a completely different interpretation of the same federal law. 
9 For in-depth reporting on the dangerous journey north that increasing numbers of 
children hazard alone to join their parents in the United States, see generally SONIA 
NAZARIO, ENRIQUE’S JOURNEY (2006). See also JESSICA JONES & JENNIFER 
PODKUL, WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N, FORCED FROM HOME: THE LOST BOYS AND 
3
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others do not. Norman’s story is one of a child who appears to be 
eligible for SIJS, based on having suffered abuse and neglect from 
his custodial parent, and for lacking a suitable home back in his home 
country. 
Norman is a fifteen-year-old boy from Honduras.10 Recently, 
he decided to leave his home in Honduras to live with his father who 
has resided without documentation in the United States since Norman 
was eight-months-old. Norman began his journey alone, riding buses 
from his hometown through Honduras and Guatemala. Norman’s 
father paid $3,000 to a network of “guides” who specialize in 
providing safe passage through Mexico en route to the United States. 
Once in Mexico, Norman was moved from one migrant “safe house” 
to another, sometimes waiting for days without food before he 
arrived safely at the Mexico-U.S. border.11 In Reynosa, Mexico, he 
waited another ten days to cross the Rio Grande River into Hidalgo, 
Texas. While in Reynosa, Norman stayed in a safe house with fifteen 
other individuals, where three armed men fed them and coordinated 
their crossings. After five days in the safe house, the armed guides 
told Norman that they would be unable to cross him unless his family 
paid an additional $1,500. Norman’s father had no choice but to pay 
the additional amount when Norman called him from the safe house 
in Reynosa. A few days later, near midnight, one of the guides took 
Norman and three others to the river, where all five of them climbed 
aboard a small inflatable raft and quietly crossed the dark water. 
Minutes after they crossed, they were caught in the flashlight beams 
of two U.S. Border Patrol agents. 
 The agents detained each person in Norman’s crossing group. 
They were taken to a small processing center, where the agents 
collected identification information and issued each of them charging 
                                                                                                                           
GIRLS OF CENTRAL AMERICA (Diana Quick & Fred Hamerman eds., 2012) 
(describing recent surges in unaccompanied minors fleeing their homes in Central 
America and entering the United States unaccompanied by a parent or guardian). 
10 Though the facts of Norman’s case track those of a real one, names and other 
identifying information have been changed to protect attorney-client 
confidentiality. 
11 A “safe house” is a shelter for migrants like Norman, where the migrants rest 
during their journey and wait for the next leg of their trip. 
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documents that the government would present to an immigration 
court in order to initiate removal proceedings in the United States.12 
Because Norman was under eighteen years of age and traveling 
without a parent or legal guardian, he was transferred to the custody 
of the U.S. Office of Refugee Resettlement (“ORR”), which began 
the process of finding a trusted adult in the United States to whom 
Norman could be released.13 Meanwhile, Norman lived in an ORR 
detention facility for minors in Harlingen, Texas. ORR assigned him 
a caseworker, who began communicating with Norman’s father to 
collect documents that would allow Norman to live with his father 
while he went through removal proceedings.14 
 While in ORR detention, Norman was visited by a paralegal 
from a local legal services organization that offers children a short 
legal orientation and screens each newly detained child for potential 
legal relief. Norman is a particularly intelligent and capable boy. 
During the legal orientation presentation he learned that sometimes 
children who have suffered abuse, neglect, or abandonment by a 
parent are eligible to apply for relief from removal. He realized that 
he might fit that definition, so during his legal screening he told his 
story. 
                                                     
12 Removal proceedings are the process by which immigration enforcement 
authorities request that an immigration judge order individuals charged as 
unlawfully present in the United States to be removed from the United States.  See 
8 U.S.C.A. § 1229(a) (West 2012).  
13 For background on how the U.S. government processes and provides for 
unaccompanied minors charged as unlawfully present in the United States, see 
generally OLGA BYRNE & ELISE MILLER, VERA INST. OF JUST., CTR. ON IMMIGR. & 
JUST., THE FLOW OF UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN THROUGH THE IMMIGRATION 
SYSTEM: A RESOURCE FOR PRACTITIONERS, POLICYMAKERS, AND RESEARCHERS 
(2012), http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/the-flow-of-
unaccompanied-children-through-the-immigration-system.pdf.  
14 ORR caseworkers work to reunite children quickly (so as to avoid lengthy 
periods of detention for children) and safely if reunification in the United States is 
possible. Children are released from custody to an eligible sponsor (often a parent, 
relative, or family friend) after completion of a reunification packet and 
background check. The sponsor is not required to have lawful immigration status in 
the United States. The forms required and more information about the reunification 
process can be found at the ORR website, at  
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/resource/unaccompanied-childrens-services.  
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 When Norman was eight-months-old, his parents took him to 
the United States. His parents were unable to find work in Honduras, 
so they decided to journey north, hoping to be able to provide for 
their son and for other members of their family struggling to survive 
in Honduras. After two years, Norman’s parents separated because 
Norman’s mother wanted to return to Honduras while his father 
wished to remain in the United States. Norman’s father pleaded with 
his wife, asking that she leave their son with him in the United States, 
but Norman’s mother refused. One day, while her husband was at 
work, she left with Norman. 
 Back in Honduras, Norman’s mother found them a place to 
live near her parents’ house. Her parents gave them money to pay 
rent and buy groceries, and Norman’s father also sent them money 
from the United States. Norman’s mother did not work and instead 
went out to parties with her friends. She occasionally had friends 
over to drink and use drugs. From an early age, Norman recalls 
seeing his mother’s friends using marijuana and cocaine in his home. 
Eventually, Norman’s mother started a relationship with one of these 
friends, a man who later became Norman’s stepfather. When Norman 
was six, Norman’s stepfather moved in with Norman and his mom, 
who was by then pregnant with Norman’s sister. Norman described 
his stepfather as an angry man. Norman does not remember ever 
seeing his stepfather work; rather, he spent his days at home, 
drinking and using drugs. 
 Norman’s stepfather lived in Norman’s home until Norman 
was thirteen. He beat Norman most days using sticks, ropes, and even 
belts. One time, he beat Norman so severely that Norman had to wear 
a cast on his leg for six months. Norman’s stepfather also beat 
Norman’s mother. Norman describes how he frequently tried to 
protect his mother from his stepfather’s beatings. First, Norman 
would take his baby sister over to his grandparents’ house. Then he 
would ride his bicycle to the police station and ask someone to go 
with him back to his house. The police would arrive to interrupt 
Norman’s stepfather beating Norman’s mother, and they would take 
his stepfather to the local jailhouse for a couple of days. When 
Norman’s stepfather was released, he returned to Norman’s home. 
6
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 Whenever Norman’s stepfather was gone for days at a time, 
Norman’s mother became aggressive with Norman and his sister. She 
hit them and insulted them, telling them that she wished they were 
never born and that they were a burden and needed to buy their own 
food. Norman always worried about his sister who had asthma. When 
his sister had asthma attacks, Norman took her to the nearby hospital. 
On more than one occasion, Norman’s grandparents offered to let 
him and his sister live with them; though they were elderly and not 
fully capable of raising two young children, they did not like how 
their daughter treated her children. But Norman’s mother would not 
let the children leave her home. Norman did not understand why his 
mother insisted on keeping Norman and his sister in her home. To 
Norman, it seemed that his mother did not love him and wished him 
dead. More times than Norman can recall, his mother locked him out 
of the house at night, forcing him to sleep in the alley next to their 
house.  
 About two years ago, Norman’s stepfather finally left 
Norman’s mother and did not return. After his departure, Norman’s 
mother became increasingly angry and depressed. Norman thought 
that she took her anger out on him and his sister. She would hit them 
and call them names on almost a daily basis. As her insults and abuse 
worsened, Norman finally told his father about what had been going 
on in their home. Though Norman’s father had called him once a 
month for as long as Norman can remember, often Norman’s mother 
did not let Norman speak with him. When Norman’s father finally 
heard of the abuse Norman had long suffered, he offered to help 
Norman travel to the United States to live with him.   
 Norman describes his father as a hardworking and extremely 
religious man, who he remembers sent him school supplies and toy 
trucks on his birthdays. Norman does not really know his father, but 
he desperately wants to go live with him. Norman thinks his father 
loves him while his mother does not. Norman decided to go to the 
United States, despite his deep concern about his sister’s well-being 
while he is away. Norman cried as he explained that he called his 
house in Honduras from the detention center and learned that his 
sister, now eight-years-old, was home alone while his mother was out 
with her friends. 
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 From what Norman disclosed in the legal screening, the 
paralegal understood that Norman appears to have suffered from 
abuse and neglect at the hands of his mother. The paralegal also 
noted that Norman does not appear to have a safe place to live in 
Honduras and that it therefore may not be in his best interest to 
return. While it is difficult to tell from what little information 
Norman knows about his father, it seems Norman would have a safe 
and loving place to live in the United States.15 The question now is 
whether U.S. immigration law, and specifically SIJS, provides a way 
for Norman to remain in the United States, rather than return home to 
his abusive mother. The answer surprisingly, depends on where in the 
United States Norman will fight his case. And this differing 
availability of federal immigration relief stems not from applicable 
state law but from divergent interpretations of the governing federal 
statute. 
 
III. SIJS Relief and Application Process 
 
 For a child in Norman’s situation, SIJS might provide an 
independent means of safety and self-reliance when the child is at the 
mercy of parents’ decisions about where to reside. SIJS is a form of 
relief available to certain non-citizen children present in the United 
States who have suffered abuse, neglect, or abandonment by a 
                                                     
15 The statute does not require that the individual have a safe and loving place to 
live in the United States, only that it not be in his or her best interest to return to the 
home country. Indeed, given the changes to the law in 2008, a child granted special 
immigrant juvenile status while in ORR custody and before he or she reaches 
eighteen is eligible for housing and other assistance via the government’s 
Unaccompanied Refugee Minors (“URM”) program.  See William Wilberforce 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 
§ 235(d)(4), 122 Stat. 5044. For more information, see Letter from Eskinder 
Negash, Dir., Office of Refugee Resettlement to State Refugee Coordinators, 
Refugee Health Coordinators, Nat’l Volunteer Agencies & Other Interested Parties, 
Eligibility for the Unaccompanied Refugee Minor Program for Children Granted 
Special Immigrant Juvenile Status by the Department of Homeland Security (Sept. 
27, 2010), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/resource/state-letter-
10-11.   
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parent.16 This important source of humanitarian relief takes into 
account the special vulnerabilities of this population and infuses 
immigration law with child protection and welfare principles.17 Being 
adjudicated a “special immigrant juvenile” (“SIJ”) allows the child to 
apply to become a lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) and reside in 
the United States indefinitely.18 As an LPR, a child has access to 
important resources unavailable to undocumented persons present in 
the United States, including financial aid for higher education, free or 
low-cost health insurance, work permits, and driver’s licenses.19 
More generally, humanitarian sources of lawful immigration status in 
the United States help to integrate those who would escape dangerous 
and unsustainable circumstances and otherwise remain in the 
shadows of society. Integration of desperate populations fleeing 
dangerous conditions thereby serves the practical purpose of 
fortifying safety and rule of law in the United States.20 
SIJS targets individuals who are arguably the most vulnerable 
among those seeking relief from dangerous conditions. As previously 
stated, those eligible for SIJS are non-citizens present in the United 
States, under the age of twenty-one, whose return to one or more 
parent is not viable due to abuse, abandonment, neglect, or some 
similar basis under state law. Furthermore, those eligible must 
demonstrate that it is not in his or her best interest to return to the 
country of birth or last habitual residence.21 The fact that these 
                                                     
16 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (West 2012). 
17 See ANGIE JUNCK ET AL., SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS AND OTHER 
IMMIGRATION OPTIONS FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH § 3.2 (3d ed. 2010) [hereinafter 
JUNCK ET AL., IMMIGRATION OPTIONS]; see also Angie Junck, Special Immigrant 
Juvenile Status: Relief for Neglected, Abused, and Abandoned Undocumented 
Children, 6 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 48 (2012) [hereinafter Junck, Special Immigrant 
Juvenile Status], 
http://www.throughtheeyes.org/files/2012_ncs_materials/B3_handout18.pdf 
(elaborating on special vulnerabilities of individuals eligible for SIJS relief). 
18 See JUNCK ET AL., IMMIGRATION OPTIONS, supra note 17, at 1-4 to 1-6.  
19 See id. 
20 See, e.g., MARC R. ROSENBLUM, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., IMMIGRANT 
LEGALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN UNION: POLICY GOALS AND 
PROGRAM DESIGN 2 (2010) (discussing societal benefits of bringing persons with 
unauthorized presence in the United States into lawful immigration status). 
21 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (West 2012). 
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individuals are undocumented, young, and lacking the support of one 
or more parents bears heavily on their ability to help themselves, in 
both a personal and a legal context. Children are less able than adults 
to access financial resources or free legal services that could help 
relieve them of dangerous circumstances, and they also often lack the 
necessary cognitive skills to make decisions in their own best 
interest.22 Their incapacity is compounded when a parent mistreats 
them, as bonds of trust are broken and feelings of love or shame can 
overwhelm a child’s natural sense of self-protection.23 In addition, 
unauthorized presence in the United States raises significant 
obstacles to self-sufficiency even for adults. Undocumented persons 
are often marginalized economically, politically, and socially and 
further subjected to a higher rate of poverty and crime.24 
A.  Explaining the Steps of the SIJS Process 
As previously mentioned, to obtain protection via SIJS, 
applicants must embark on what is essentially a three-step process 
that involves state and federal authorities. The first step is to obtain 
the predicate findings, those required by the federal definition of 
“special immigrant juvenile,” from a state court. Next, with those 
findings in hand in the form of a certified court order, the applicant 
can file an application for SIJS with United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (“USCIS”). Finally, once SIJS status is 
approved, the applicant can seek lawful permanent residence in the 
U.S., either before USCIS or an immigration judge. The details of 
these processes are provided below. 
Step 1:  Obtain Predicate Findings from State Court 
A child must ask a state court, acting as a juvenile court, for 
certain predicate findings in order to begin the SIJS process. The 
federal regulations define “juvenile court” as one having jurisdiction 
under state law to make judicial determinations about the custody and 
care of juveniles.25 The findings may be obtained in the context of a 
variety of proceedings that might include custody, child welfare, 
guardianship, adoption, delinquency, or declaratory actions. The 
                                                     
22 See, e.g., JUNCK ET AL., IMMIGRATION OPTIONS, supra note 17, at 2-3 to 2-4 
23 Id. at 2-11. 
24 Id. at 1-4. 
25 See 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a) (2013). 
10
Children's Legal Rights Journal, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 6
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/clrj/vol33/iss1/6
Children’s Legal Rights Journal                    Volume 33, Spring 2013 
Uneven Access to Special Immigration Juvenile Status 
74 
 
petitioner bringing the proceedings may be the child or an adult 
caregiver or agency seeking responsibility over the child. The court 
presiding over the proceedings must find: (1) that the child is 
dependent on a juvenile court or has been legally committed to, or 
placed, under the custody of, an agency or department of a State, or 
an individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court;26 (2) 
that reunification with one or both parents is not viable due to abuse, 
neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis under State law; and (3) that 
it would not be in the child’s best interest to be returned to the child’s 
or parent’s previous country of nationality or country of last habitual 
residence.27    
Step 2:  File Application for Visa with Immigration Agency 
Next, the child must complete a Petition for Amerasian, 
Widow(er), or Special Immigrant (Form I-360), and submit it to 
USCIS, which is required by law to adjudicate the petition within 180 
days.28 The child must include with his or her application a certified 
copy of the court order obtained in Step 1 mentioned above. If the I-
360 is approved, the child has attained SIJ status and is immediately 
                                                     
26 SIJS does not necessarily affect custody. The court must find the child 
“dependent” on the court, which might simply mean the court asserts jurisdiction 
over the child. See, e.g., JUNCK ET AL., IMMIGRATION OPTIONS, supra note 17, § 
4.3. 
27 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (West 2012).  
28 For a description of this SIJS application process, see generally Interoffice 
Memorandum from William R. Yates, Assoc. Dir. for Operations, U.S. Citizenship 
& Immigration Servs., to Reg’l Dirs. & Dist. Dirs., Memorandum 3—Field 
Guidance on Special Immigrant Juvenile Status Petitions (May 27, 2004) 
[hereinafter Memorandum, Field Guidance on Special Immigrant Juvenile Status 
Petitions], available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/Archives
%201998-2008/2004/sij_memo_052704.pdf; see also SIJ: After You File, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6
d1a/?vgnextoid=2b798b6ee9af0310VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchan
nel=2b798b6ee9af0310VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD (last updated July 12, 
2011) (describing the time period in which the courts will act after receiving an 
application).  
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eligible to adjust status to an LPR.29 To do so, the child must 
complete an Application to Adjust Status (Form I-485).30  
Step 3:  Apply for Lawful Permanent Residency with 
Immigration Authorities 
Adjudication of the Form I-485 involves a background check, 
medical exam, lengthy questionnaire, and in most cases, an interview 
with an immigration official exploring the child’s past behavior and 
activities.31 This process is designed to screen for any grounds for 
inadmissibility that would foreclose one’s ability to become an LPR, 
such as a history of certain criminal activities or membership in a 
terrorist organization.32 The process for becoming an LPR for a child 
already eligible for SIJS can take many months or even years, and 
additionally requires the help of immigration attorneys who are both 
knowledgeable about working with traumatized children and willing 
to handle these work-intensive cases at little or no cost.33 
B. Delegation to and Deference for State Courts 
As previously stated, this Article focuses on the first step of 
the SIJS application process which is the request to a state court for a 
predicate order making the required SIJS findings. The SIJS statute 
requires the use of family or juvenile courts to enter findings as to 
whether the child meets the criteria for SIJS. The statute 
contemplates use of local entities for those findings because of their 
special expertise in making determinations as to family situations, 
evaluating best-interest factors, and understanding other child welfare 
issues.34 Choosing to use the courts for this purpose is an indication 
of Congress’s interest in protecting these children and providing for 
their safety and welfare. Using state entities to help administer 
                                                     
29 Memorandum, Field Guidance on Special Immigrant Juvenile Status Petitions, 
supra note 28. 
30 Id. 
31 Id.; SIJ: After You File, supra note 28. 
32 Memorandum, Field Guidance on Special Immigrant Juvenile Status Petitions, 
supra note 28; SIJ: After You File, supra note 28. 
33 See, e.g., Junck, Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, supra note 17, at 52. 
34 See Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS), IMMIGR. CTR. FOR WOMEN & 
CHILD., http://icwclaw.org/services-available/special-immigrant-juvenile-status-
sils/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2013) (describing the role of state juvenile courts in 
making best interest determinations for children as part of their eligibility for SIJS).  
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federal law, however, always involves a risk of variance between 
localities in the enforcement of the federal law. For example, judges 
in State A could interpret and apply the requirements for SIJS 
differently from judges in State B, so that the same child might be 
eligible for the protection in State A but unable to obtain it in State B. 
Congress must take this potential for non-uniformity and arbitrariness 
in the application of the law into account when allowing local 
officials to participate in federal law administration and enforcement.   
Such interstate variance presents special problems in the 
context of immigration law. Immigration policymaking is delegated 
to the federal government, as it involves the treatment of foreign 
nationals who should be treated uniformly nationwide. In areas of 
immigration law that use local officials to enter predicate orders and 
make findings necessary for a foreign national to obtain immigration 
relief, the local officials are often wary of the implications of their 
actions and nervous about what they perceive as making decisions 
about whether a person will obtain an immigration benefit.35 Some 
may not want to participate in what they perceive as a process that 
condones or further encourages illegal immigration. This 
apprehension can be addressed by reference to the congressional 
intent, which purposefully relies on the special expertise of local 
officials that is not available to federal immigration authorities.36 In 
                                                     
35 For example, in the area of U Visas, which are available to victims of crimes in 
the United States who are subsequently helpful in the investigation or prosecution 
of that crime, the local law enforcement agency must certify the fact that the 
victims have been or are likely to be helpful. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., U VISA LAW ENFORCEMENT CERTIFICATION RESOURCE GUIDE FOR FEDERAL, 
STATE, LOCAL, TRIBAL AND TERRITORIAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 2, 16, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs_u_visa_certification_guide.pdf; Cindy V. 
Culp, Waco Judge Grants U-Visa to Girl After DA Denied Paperwork, WACO 
TRIB., Dec. 14, 2012 (on file with the author) (describing a recent report from 
Waco, Texas, that explains the reasons that local officials are wary of providing 
this certification).  
36 A 1997 House of Representatives Conference Report indicates that “[t]he 
conferees intend that the involvement of the Attorney General is for the purposes of 
determining special immigrant juvenile status and not for making determinations of 
dependency status.” H.R. REP. NO. 105-405, at 130 (1997) (Conf. Rep.). In line 
with this expressed intent, a March 24, 2009 USCIS policy memorandum instructs 
immigration officers adjudicating SIJS petitions “to avoid questioning a child about 
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addition, variances can be minimized by careful attention to the 
limited role of the local officials, who are often asked, and permitted, 
only to enter discrete factual findings that will be reviewed by federal 
officials in the context of a greater inquiry as to the eligibility of an 
applicant for the immigration relief sought. In the case of SIJS, once 
the factual findings are obtained from the state court, the applicant 
still must apply for SIJ status with the immigration authorities and, 
contemporaneously or subsequently, apply for lawful permanent 
residence in order to legalize his or her status. The role of local 
officials is limited to the first step and does not itself bestow upon the 
applicant any immigration status or benefit. 
C. Variance Among the State Courts 
In the SIJS context, recent developments in state court 
handling of predicate orders have created a situation in which access 
to SIJS relief meaningfully differs across and even within states. First 
is the issue of post-eighteen-year-old SIJs: the SIJ statute holds an 
individual eligible for SIJS until the age of twenty-one, but courts 
that are asked to enter findings in SIJS cases generally do not take 
cases for children over the age of eighteen.37 Courts across state lines 
differ as to whether they are willing to continue jurisdiction. The 
Department of Homeland Security, including its Ombudsman office, 
is taking up this issue in favor of allowing continuing jurisdiction for 
                                                                                                                           
the details of the abuse, abandonment or neglect suffered, as those matters were 
handled by juvenile court, applying state law.” Interoffice Memorandum from 
Donald Neufeld, Acting Assoc. Dir. Domestic Operations & Pearl Chang, Acting 
Chief, Office of Policy & Strategy, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., to Field 
Leadership, Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008: Special 
Immigrant Juvenile Status Provisions 3 (Mar. 24, 2009) [hereinafter Memorandum, 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008], available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/2009/TV
PRA_SIJ.pdf. A separate but relevant point is that, as Angela Lloyd put it, “the 
dual role of guardian and border enforcer are incongruous and cannot mimic the 
environment of a state juvenile court in which parties are expressly driven by the 
custodial and best interests of children.” Angela Lloyd, Regulating Consent: 
Protecting Undocumented Immigrant Children from their (Evil) Step-Uncle Sam, 
or How to Ameliorate the Impact of the 1997 Amendments to the SIJ Law, 15 B.U. 
PUB. INT. L.J. 237, 258 (2006). 
37 For an overview of this issue, see generally JUNCK ET AL., IMMIGRATION 
OPTIONS, supra note 17, § 3.2, at 3-8 to 3-10. 
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children until age twenty-one.38 The second area of disparity is with 
“one-parent SIJ,” which, as explained below, means one parent has 
been the source of abuse, neglect, or abandonment and is not a 
suitable parent to whom the child can return. To determine whether 
the child qualifies for “one-parent SIJ,” the state court must interpret 
the federal statutory language, which requires that a court find 
reunification with “one or both parents” is not viable due to abuse, 
neglect, or abandonment. 
Norman’s case, described above, involves this latter issue of 
one-parent SIJS. In one-parent SIJS cases, one parent has been the 
source of abuse, neglect, or abandonment and is not a suitable parent 
to whom the child can return. For Norman however, there is another 
parent with whom reunification seems viable. While Norman appears 
eligible for SIJS predicate findings under the plain language of the 
statute, a recent opinion of the Nebraska Supreme Court would likely 
lead to the conclusion that Norman is excluded from SIJS relief. The 
next Part explores the basis of this recent opinion and its impact, both 
on Norman’s case and more generally. 
 
IV. Recent Nebraska Supreme Court Precedent 
 
A recent decision from the Nebraska Supreme Court has 
caused great concern among non-profit legal service providers and 
immigration advocates who serve children like Norman. The decision 
is alarming because it introduces a novel interpretation of the SIJ 
definition that, if followed in other states, would foreclose SIJS relief 
for many children previously thought to be eligible. The Nebraska 
case is significant because Nebraska’s is the only highest court in the 
country that has weighed in on this issue. Because of that, despite it 
not being binding outside Nebraska, the decision might be used as 
persuasive precedent by courts around the country. A summary of the 
case facts, procedural history, and the appellate court’s reasoning are 
provided below. 
A. In re Erick M. 
                                                     
38 See CIS Ombudsman, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, 
www.dhs.gov/cisombudsman (last visited Feb. 1, 2013). 
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In In re Erick M., a juvenile Erick, was committed to the care 
and custody of a Nebraska state agency, the Office of Juvenile 
Services (“OJS”), after he was twice charged with being a minor in 
possession of alcohol.39 While in state custody, “Erick had 
continually disappeared from the residential center, used alcohol and 
drugs, committed law violations, and threatened the staff.”40 
Investigation into his family situation revealed that his father had 
long abandoned Erick but that his mother was active in his life and 
waiting for Erick to return to her following his time in OJS custody. 
During a hearing, his attorney stated “Erick’s goal was to ‘get back 
home’ and work on a rehabilitation program from there.”41 After 
nearly a year in state custody, Erick brought a motion for SIJS 
findings.42 Erick sought SIJS based on the fact that he was under 
state custody, his father had long abandoned him, and it was not in 
his best interest to return to Mexico, his country of birth.43  
The juvenile court held a hearing on the motion for SIJS 
findings and heard evidence as to whether reunification with one or 
both parents was not viable due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment. A 
family permanency specialist testified that she had no contact 
information for Erick’s father and that she did not know whether 
paternity had ever been established.44 She also testified that Erick did 
not know his father’s whereabouts.45 The family permanency 
specialist further testified that she knew of no reports or 
investigations of abuse or neglect by Erick’s mother and that she 
intended to continue to work with the mother once Erick was 
released back into his mother’s care.46 The juvenile court, having 
heard this evidence, denied Erick’s motion on the basis that “the facts 
                                                     
39 In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Neb. 2012). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 It is unclear who brought the motion for SIJS findings on Erick’s behalf. The 
authors speculate that Erick’s counsel in his delinquency proceedings may have 
brought the motion, though an immigration attorney not otherwise involved in his 
delinquency proceedings could instead have brought the motion.    
43 In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 642. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 643. 
46 Id. at 642-43. 
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failed to show that reunification with Erick’s mother was not viable 
because of abuse, neglect, or abandonment.”47 Specifically, the court 
found that:  
(1) it had removed Erick from his home because of his 
alcohol abuse and he had never been removed from 
his mother’s home because of abuse, neglect, or 
abandonment; (2) Erick’s mother had been present at 
almost every hearing; (3) Erick had lived with her 
before the court committed him to OJS; and (4) no 
evidence showed that he would not be returned to his 
mother when he was paroled or discharged . . . .48  
 
The court made no finding as to whether Erick’s father had 
abandoned Erick, essentially ending the inquiry once it found that 
there was one parent with whom reunification was feasible.49   
Erick appealed, arguing that the court erred in finding that he 
did not satisfy the reunification prong.50 He argued that the plain 
language of the statute required that he show no more than that 
reunification with his father was not viable due to abandonment.51 He 
pointed out that the use of the disjunctive “or” in the term “1 or both” 
in the statute meant that so long as he had satisfied the first, i.e., 
shown that reunification with one parent was not viable due to abuse, 
neglect, or abandonment, he need not show more to satisfy the 
reunification prong.52 The state, in turn, argued that the plain 
language precluded Erick’s interpretation, asserting that his 
interpretation rendered the words “or both” superfluous.53 The state 
further argued that “Congress did not intend for courts to ignore the 
presence of a parent with whom reunification is feasible” and that 
                                                     
47 Id. at 643. The court also found that there was “no evidence that Erick’s father 
had ever abused or neglected Erick,” though it made no findings as to whether the 
father had abandoned Erick. Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
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“under Erick’s interpretation, a juvenile court would be required to 
find that the reunification component was satisfied every time the 
State could not identify or find a juvenile’s parent, even when 
reunification with the other parent was appropriate.”54 
The case turned on this contested meaning of “one or both.” 
To resolve the dispute, the Nebraska Supreme Court looked first to 
the statute’s plain language, which it found ambiguous given the 
language’s susceptibility to more than one reasonable 
interpretation.55 Though it conceded that Erick’s was a reasonable 
reading of the language, the court introduced an alternative 
reasonable reading and explanation for the use of the disjunctive 
“or”:  
Because “or” describes what a juvenile court must 
determine in the alternative, we could also reasonably 
interpret the phrase “1 or both” parents to mean that a 
juvenile court must find, depending on the 
circumstances, that either reunification with one 
parent is not feasible or reunification with both 
parents is not feasible.56  
 
Under the court’s formulation, the disjunctive functions to set up the 
two types of cases that might be at issue—that the child has either 
one parent for whom reunification is at issue or that the child has two 
parents for whom reunification is at issue, depending on whether the 
child lived with one or both around the time of the determination.57 
                                                     
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 644-46. 
56 Id. at 644. 
57 See id. at 647 (“[I]f a juvenile lives with only one parent when a juvenile court 
enters a guardianship or dependency order, the reunification component under 
§1101(a)(27)(J) is not satisfied if a petitioner fails to show that it is not feasible to 
return the juvenile to the parent who had custody. . . . In contrast, if the juvenile 
was living with both parents before a guardianship or dependency order was issued, 
reunification with both parents is usually at issue.”). Confusingly, however, the 
court simultaneously determines that the issues of reunification with both parents 
will always be at issue. See id. That is, the court must decide whether reunification 
with either parent is viable. While this complicates the suggestion that the 
disjunctive can be explained in the way the court suggests, the court merely uses its 
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This formulation deals, albeit indirectly, with the state’s concern of 
the superfluity of the term “or both.” 
Having found the language susceptible to more than one 
reasonable interpretation, the court deemed it ambiguous and turned 
to sources outside the statute to interpret it.58 Focusing first on 
legislative history, the court noted the progression of SIJS language 
over time.59 The court pointed out that originally SIJS findings 
consisted only of “a judicial or administrative order determining . . . 
that the juvenile alien was dependent on a juvenile court and that it 
would not be in the juvenile’s best interest to be returned to the 
juvenile’s or parent’s home country.”60 The court then noted that in a 
1997 amendment, Congress restricted SIJS eligibility, requiring a 
court determination that the juvenile is “eligible for long-term foster 
care due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment.”61 The court found 
legislative history indicating, “Congress intended that the [1997] 
amendment would prevent youths from using this remedy for the 
purpose of obtaining legal permanent resident status, rather than for 
the purpose of obtaining relief from abuse or neglect.”62 In 
                                                                                                                           
reformulation to explain that it finds the language ambiguous and open to outside 
sources of interpretation. See id. at 644. 
58 Id. at 644. The court correctly points out that it is confined to the statute’s 
language unless it has found that language ambiguous: “We will not look beyond 
the statute to determine the legislative intent when the words are plain, direct, or 
unambiguous.” Id. After explaining the two separate functions of the disjunctive 
“or,” the court explains that no other language in the statute helps to clarify the 
meaning: “Unfortunately, there are no related provisions in the act from which we 
can discern Congress’ intent.” Id. In an apparent misstep, however, the court next 
turns to agency guidance during this ambiguity determination, stating, “Absent any 
statutory or regulatory guidance, we conclude that the statute is ambiguous 
because the parties have both presented reasonable, but conflicting, interpretations 
of its language.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing Project Extra Mile v. Neb. Liquor 
Control Comm’n, 810 N.W.2d 149, 163 (Neb. 2012) (“[D]eference to an agency's 
interpretation of its governing statutes is improper when the statutes are 
unambiguous . . . .”)). This erroneous searching for agency guidance during the 
ambiguity determination is ultimately inconsequential, however, since the court 
finds that there are no agency guidelines shedding light on the issue at hand. Id. 
59 Id. at 644-46. 
60 Id. at 645. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
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regulations following the 1997 amendment, “immigration authorities 
interpreted the ‘eligible for long-term foster care’ requirement to 
mean that ‘a determination has been made by the juvenile court that 
family reunification is no longer a viable option.’”63 
The court then considered the 2008 amendment to the 
statutory definition of a special immigrant juvenile, which introduced 
the “1 or both” language at issue in Erick’s case. The court noted that 
the “2008 changes expanded the pool of juvenile aliens who could 
apply for SIJ status” and recognized that Congress removed the 
requirement that a state juvenile court find that a juvenile is eligible 
for long-term foster care.64 Although the court did not say so, this 
revelation seems to have triggered the following question for the 
court: when Congress eliminated the requirement that a court find 
“family reunification is no longer a viable option due to abuse, 
neglect, or abandonment” and replaced it with the requirement that a 
court find that “reunification with 1 or both parents is not viable due 
to abuse, neglect, or abandonment,” did Congress intend that a court 
no longer consider reunification with both parents? That is, would the 
inquiry end once a court found that, for example, a child could not be 
reunified with a father because that father had abandoned the child? 
If so, Erick’s argument would prevail. And therefore, courts could 
ignore the question of whether there was nevertheless a parent with 
whom reunification was viable. 
In exploring this question of Congress’s intent, the court 
looked to whether agency officials and judges considered 
reunification with both parents when one parent was found to have 
abandoned the child.65 The court concluded that “even when 
reunification with an absent parent is not feasible because the 
juvenile has never known the parent or the parent has abandoned the 
child, USCIS and juvenile courts generally still consider whether 
reunification with the known parent is an option.”66 In support, the 
court cited three opinions in which USCIS or a court made findings 
as to both parents, even though there was a determination that one 
                                                     
63 Id. at 645-46. 
64 Id. at 645. 
65 Id. at 646-47. 
66 Id. at 646. 
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parent had abandoned the child.67 None of these cases however, 
include a discussion as to whether all the findings were required; they 
include the findings without more discussion.68 The court 
nevertheless seemed satisfied that “USCIS does not consider proof of 
one absent parent to be the end of its inquiry . . . . A petitioner must 
normally show that reunification with the other parent is also not 
feasible.”69 In Erick’s case, this meant that “[b]ecause Erick was 
living with . . . his mother when the juvenile court adjudicated him, 
he could not satisfy the reunification component without showing 
that reunification with his mother was not feasible.”70 
B. The Nebraska Supreme Court’s Novel Interpretation of 
SIJS Law 
 In interpreting “one or both” to mean that Erick had to 
demonstrate that reunification with both parents was not feasible, the 
court seems not only to have departed from the plain language of the 
statute, but also improperly to have imbued its decision with 
concerns as to opening the floodgates of immigration relief to 
children abandoned by one parent. On its face, the statute requires an 
inquiry as to whether reunification with one or both parents “is not 
feasible because of abuse, neglect, or abandonment.”71 The court’s 
application of the language instead asks whether reunification with 
either parent is viable; if “the juvenile has a safe parent to whose 
custody a court can return the juvenile,” the child will not qualify for 
SIJS.72 This seems to nullify the 2008 amendment written, as the 
court noted, in the spirit of expanding SIJS eligibility. That is, the 
court’s application reverts to the pre-2008 requirement that a child 
show that family reunification is no longer an option.73 
                                                     
67 Id. at 646 nn.31 & 35. 
68 See In re Trudy-Ann W. v. Joan W., 901 N.Y.S.2d 296, 298 (App. Div. 2010); In 
re [Male Juvenile From Mexico], 2011 WL 7790423, at *3 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Immigration & Naturalization Servs., Office of Admin. Appeals Mar. 15, 2011); In 
re O.Y., 2009 WL 5196007, at *2 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Sept. 22, 2009).  
69 In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 647. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 643 (emphasis added) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i) (2012)).  
72 Id. at 647. 
73 “[W]e disagree that when a court determines that a juvenile should not be 
reunited with the parent with whom he or she has been living, it can disregard 
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It seems that the court was preoccupied primarily with the 
expansion of the SIJS relief beyond those for whom it believes the 
relief was intended. The court repeatedly referred to the notion that 
“protecting the juvenile from parental abuse, neglect, or 
abandonment must be the petitioner’s primary purpose” in pursuing 
SIJS relief.74 The court also seemed to believe that children 
abandoned by one parent but in the custody of the other parent do not 
fall under the SIJS statute, despite having conceded that this is a 
reasonable interpretation of the current SIJS language. While this 
sensitivity to the function and purpose of SIJS is not inappropriate for 
a court interpreting the SIJS language, it does appear at odds with the 
purpose of state court involvement in SIJS findings: to enter limited, 
discrete factual findings as to the child’s family situation based on 
the court’s expertise in child welfare and best interest considerations. 
Indeed, the court’s considerable effort in nailing down a definition of 
the “1 parent” language contradicts even the court’s own recognition 
that “Congress wanted to give state courts and federal authorities 
flexibility to consider a juvenile’s family circumstances in 
determining whether reunification with the juvenile’s parent or 
parents is feasible.”75  
                                                                                                                           
whether reunification with an absent parent is not feasible because of abuse, 
neglect, or abandonment.” Id. at 648. While earlier the court suggested that the 
relevance of the fitness of one parent or the other would depend on the parent with 
whom the child was living at the time of the determination, this statement suggests 
that the court expects no such distinction to be drawn. Under any circumstance, the 
fitness of both parents is at issue. See id. (“[W]hen ruling on a petitioner’s motion 
for an eligibility order under [the SIJS statute], a court should generally consider 
whether reunification with either parent is feasible.”). This essentially nullifies the 
introduction of the one-parent language and the elimination of the long-term foster 
care eligibility requirement.   
74 See id. at 645-48. 
75 Id. at 642. This statement of congressional intent is in line with the fact that there 
is no legislative history on the one-parent language, and the fact that the 
administering agency’s proposed regulations also fail to clarify the meaning of the 
term. The absence of federal guidance may indicate an intent to allow state officials 
ample space to apply the law in line with general principles, in this case, of child 
welfare and protection. 
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A New York family court considering In re Erick M. 
commented that the Nebraska court seemed to go too far, and held in 
favor of immigration gatekeeping rather than child welfare:76 
The function of the juvenile court in deciding an 
application for special findings which would permit a 
juvenile to file an application for adjustment of status 
as a special immigrant juvenile is limited in scope. . . . 
The juvenile court need not determine any other 
issues, such as what the motivation of the juvenile in 
making application for the required findings might be 
. . . . Whether or not a juvenile’s application 
constitutes a potential abuse or misuse of the SIJ 
provisions of the immigration law is an issue to be 
determined by the USCIS. That issue is beyond the 
scope of what a state juvenile court is required to 
decide upon. . . .77 
 
The New York court therefore refused to apply Nebraska’s approach, 
though it felt compelled to address it. The New York court 
demonstrates how a family court could apply the plain language of 
the statute in favor of a child like Erick, whose reading was, after all, 
deemed reasonable by the Nebraska court. It also directly 
acknowledges and executes the state court’s limited role in SIJS 
proceedings: to enter factual findings permitted under the statutory 
language in light of child welfare and best interest considerations. 
Thus limiting its reach, the New York court shows how family courts 
across the country can enter predicate findings without delving into 
immigration policy considerations and thereby encroaching on 
determinations reserved for federal immigration authorities.  
                                                     
76 In re Mario S., 954 N.Y.S.2d 843, 853 (Fam. Ct. 2012). While Nebraska state 
law is not binding outside its borders, the New York court seemed compelled to 
comment on the recent opinion. Id. at 852. (“This Court would be remiss in not 
setting forth why it declines to follow the recent opinion of the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska in Erick M. . . . .”). This might be because, as previously stated, 
Nebraska’s is the only high court to have weighed in on the issue, which arguably 
adds persuasive weight to the decision. 
77 Id. 
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Unfortunately it so happens that Norman, introduced above in 
Part II, is not headed to New York but instead plans to live with his 
father in Omaha, Nebraska. Once reunified there with his father, In 
Re Erick M. will likely operate to preclude Norman’s access to SIJS 
relief.78 This situation highlights an obstacle for the legal services 
providers screening Norman: in order to assess his eligibility for 
relief, the advocates must know where Norman will fight his case and 
keep abreast of how SIJS language is being applied in that 
jurisdiction. This kind of logistical burden could be avoided if state 
courts limited their involvement in defining statutory language and 
instead applied the language in any permissible way that allows them 
to serve the best interest of the particular child at issue. As it stands 
however, Norman will likely be deemed ineligible for SIJS relief and 
left without means to lawfully remain with his one suitable 
caretaker—ineligible based solely on where in the United States he 
fights the case.  
C. A Lack of Guidance for the State Courts 
 The Nebraska Supreme Court struggled with what it deemed 
ambiguous language, and it did so without any real guidance from 
Congress or USCIS. There is no legislative history illuminating 
Congress’s intent in introducing the disjunctive phrase at issue in In 
re Erick M.  Current regulations have yet to be amended to reflect the 
2008 changes to the SIJS definition. Indeed, current regulations are 
particularly confusing to state court judges who reference them, as 
they still contain the outdated requirement that the child qualify for 
                                                     
78 Of course there are creative ways for advocates to argue that the Nebraska 
court’s holding should not apply to Norman. For instance, one could argue that the 
true “custodial” parent in Norman’s case is his mother, who was the custodial 
parent at the time when Norman sought SIJS relief. One might also argue that 
Norman’s reunification with his father is not “viable” because his father is 
unlawfully present in the United States. See, e.g., In re Welfare of D.A.M., No. 
A12–0427, 2012 WL 6097225, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2012) (“Planning 
for the return of appellant to his mother after his placement does not answer the 
question of whether appellant will be able to successfully live in her care. The 
viability of appellant’s reunification with his mother for SIJS purposes requires the 
district court to consider her present living conditions, her willingness and ability to 
care for appellant, and all other relevant circumstances, so as to make a conclusion 
about whether that reunification is ‘practicable’ or ‘capable of succeeding.’”). 
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long-term foster care.79 Though new regulations are in the works, the 
proposed draft revealed that they do not explicitly address the issue 
of one-parent SIJS. In its commentary to the proposed regulations, 
USCIS seems to recognize the “one or both parents” language to 
mean “expanded eligibility” for SIJS.80 But without an explicit 
recognition of the validity of one-parent SIJS cases, advocates are at 
a loss when briefing unfamiliar state court judges on the availability 
of one-parent SIJS relief. Finally, USCIS has issued no official public 
legal memoranda articulating its policy on the validity of SIJS 
petitions based on one-parent facts.     
D. Working Toward Uniformity 
If Congress meant for SIJS not to apply to a child who had 
been abandoned by one parent, it can so clarify by once again 
amending the definition of “special immigrant juvenile.” Further 
amendment by Congress could also clarify that SIJS was intended to 
apply to children abandoned by a single parent, even if residing with 
or able to reunify with the second parent. An amendment could be a 
step toward uniformity in helping avoid Norman’s situation, so that 
protection under the law is triggered not by a child’s circumstances 
and needs but by his geographical location.   
Any further legislation should take into account a child like 
Norman. Although one might argue that the feasibility of Norman’s 
reunification with his father can fairly preclude Norman from relief 
because he can return with his father to Honduras, this argument 
disregards the independent protection of Norman, who has been 
unable to control the residence choices of his parents. Child welfare 
and protection require that vulnerable children like Norman have 
independent access to legal relief. Norman is a child in need of safe 
custody, and that is not an option for him in his home country. Now 
that he is in the United States, safe repatriation is an issue 
immigration officials must consider under the William Wilberforce 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 
                                                     
79 See 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a) (2013). 
80 See Special Immigrant Juvenile Petitions, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,978, 54,979 (proposed 
Sept. 6, 2011) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 204, 205, 245). 
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(“TVPRA”). A child like Norman, involuntarily at the mercy of his 
parents’ relocation decisions, needs an outlet for relief and safety. 
This is in line with international child protection and humanitarian 
principles. This should be the driving force for developing relief for 
immigrant children as it was in introducing SIJS. 
 Of course, new legislation takes a substantial amount of time 
and resources for enactment and is therefore not the simplest fix to 
the “one-parent” dilemma. A more practical solution may actually 
come from USCIS. The agency could recognize the validity of one-
parent claims in its new regulations, thereby giving advocates a 
concrete provision in the Federal Register to which they can refer a 
state court judge. Alternatively, the agency could issue a public legal 
memorandum directing USCIS officers adjudicating SIJS claims and 
the public on the agency’s interpretation of the “one or both” 
requirement. As an example, USCIS issued an initial memorandum 
regarding the TVPRA on March 24, 200981 and although that 
memorandum clearly indicates that it is meant to be guidance created 
“solely for the purpose of USCIS personnel in performing their 
duties,” it still carries substantial weight and can offer guidance for 
more than just USCIS adjudicators as to the agency’s application of 
the statute.82 Four years after that initial memorandum, and with the 
current ability to reflect on how the law has been utilized across 
states, an update is necessary. 
E.  Advocacy After Nebraska’s Decision 
 Advocates do not have the luxury of simply awaiting 
clarification from Congress or USCIS, of course, as they continue to 
encounter children eligible for one-parent SIJS on a daily basis. 
Those advocates must continue to act quickly to try to discern where 
a child may ultimately be headed in the United States and to 
strategize about the child’s options for legal relief on that basis. If a 
child is destined for an unfriendly jurisdiction like Nebraska, it may 
be a reason to prioritize his or her case and obtain the predicate order 
in any other jurisdiction that might be appropriate. Otherwise, justice 
                                                     
81 Memorandum, Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, 
supra note 36. 
82 Id. at 5. State court judges with little or no knowledge of immigration law might 
find such memoranda particularly helpful. 
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delayed will be justice denied. This sort of strategizing is not 
something advocates are unfamiliar with, of course. They often must 
consider the availability of free or low cost legal services in the 
child’s destination area; where those services are not available, 
advocates do their best to make sure a child obtains legal assistance 
before he or she departs. But the type of strategizing involved with 
analyzing the one-parent dilemma is different. Advocates will need to 
keep abreast of state law on SIJS claims as it develops across the 
country. To do so, advocates across organizations and state lines will 
need to continue to collaborate and effectively share information. 
It may also be time for advocates to reach across practice 
lines, to their brethren in state family and juvenile law for assistance. 
Those practitioners are more familiar with state law as it applies to 
youth and with the challenges faced and concerns held by state court 
judges. Additionally, they share with immigration advocates a 
common interest—looking out and seeking justice for our vulnerable 
youths. Partnerships with local family law practitioners could help 
unveil the mystery of, and demonstrate the credibility of, SIJS before 
hesitant state court judges. With family and juvenile lawyers bridging 
both worlds, immigration advocates could participate in state judicial 
conference trainings and could provide explanatory materials about 
SIJS.   
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 SIJS is an important benefit for children unlawfully present 
in the United States who have suffered parental abuse, neglect, or 
abandonment. Through recent precedent, the Nebraska Supreme 
Court restricted access to SIJS relief, apparently acting out of 
concern over immigration policy and thereby taking on the federal 
role of immigration gatekeeper. The current statutory definition of 
“special immigrant juvenile” allows for USCIS to approve 
applications for SIJS in one-parent cases like those of Erick and 
Norman. For a state court to fail to issue factual findings requested 
by a child, especially when the necessary evidence supporting those 
findings is in the record, due to principles of immigration policy—
and perhaps fears of overextension of immigration benefits—is 
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inappropriate. The state courts ought to be focused on principles of 
child welfare and best interest analysis because that is their limited 
and prescribed role in the SIJS scheme. Whether a child is ultimately 
eligible for SIJS involves analysis that should, and does, belong to 
federal immigration authorities alone. Admittedly, the Nebraska 
Supreme Court’s decision was made in the absence of real guidance 
from federal authorities. Congress, USCIS, or both must clarify for 
the states what the 2008 amendments to the statutory definition of 
“special immigrant juvenile” mean and how the “one or both” 
language was intended to be applied.   
 In the meantime, though it is within a state court’s 
delegated authority and expertise to decide whether parental 
reunification is possible and what is in the child’s best interest, it is 
not the state court’s role within the SIJS scheme to close the door on 
protection from deportation for these vulnerable children. Children 
for whom SIJS relief was arguably intended will be denied relief if 
they are so unlucky as to fight their cases in Nebraska. If other states 
rely on Nebraska’s decision as persuasive authority, then 
immigration advocates will be forced into a costly game of forum 
shopping in order to protect clients from deportation. Clearly, justice 
dictates that relief for the children served depends on their real needs, 
not their latitude and longitude measured at a particular point in time. 
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